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Abstract
This paper shows how separation of ownership and control may arise as a
response to overload costs, despite agency costs, and how conglomerates arise as
solution to information asymmetries in capital markets. In a context where en-
trepreneurs have the ability to run projects and improve their future cash °ow,
there could be rationing of credit due to moral hazard between entrepreneurs
and investors. Diversi¯cation could mitigate the moral hazard problem. How-
ever for a single entrepreneur running many di®erent projects might be in-
creasingly costly due to overload costs. Delegating the running of projects to
several managers can not only reduce overload costs, but also the moral haz-
ard problem of external ¯nancing. In this paper we show that delegation can
be the only way to exploit the gains from diversi¯cation when overload costs
of diversi¯cation are high; delegation thus is the key ingredient to be able to
diversify.
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Abstract: This paper shows how separation of ownership and control may arise as a
response to overload costs, despite agency costs, and how conglomerates arise as solu-
tion to information asymmetries in capital markets. In a context where entrepreneurs
have the ability to run projects and improve their future cash °ow, there could be
rationing of credit due to moral hazard between entrepreneurs and investors. Diversi-
¯cation could mitigate the moral hazard problem. However for a single entrepreneur
running many di®erent projects might be increasingly costly due to overload costs.
Delegating the running of projects to several managers can not only reduce overload
costs, but also the moral hazard problem of external ¯nancing. In this paper we show
that delegation can be the only way to exploit the gains from diversi¯cation when
overload costs of diversi¯cation are high; delegation thus is the key ingredient to be
able to diversify.
Keywords: Conglomerates; Delegation; Diversi¯cation; Monitoring.
JEL classi¯cation: D23; D82; G20; G32; L22.
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1 Introduction
This paper is about the corporate structure, the organizational structure, and the
¯nancial structure of ¯rms, and how they relate to each other. We often model the
¯rm as producer of a single good. In reality, however, many ¯rms produce more
than one single good and some ¯rms are indeed quite diversi¯ed. Why do then ¯rms
diversify and is diversi¯cation good or bad from a social point of view? Merging
di®erent types of activities inside one ¯rm could without any doubts be bene¯cial
whenever there are economies of scope in production, but why would conglomerates,
whose main activity is to undertake projects in unrelated lines of business, arise?
A standard result in corporate ¯nance is that, with perfect capital markets, con-
glomerates do not add any value. The theoretical explanation is that if the investors
set of opportunities is not restricted, each single investor can replicate on his own the
diversi¯ed portfolio of a conglomerate.1 Furthermore, investors are able to diversify
at lower costs than ¯rms do, as there are agency costs in a divisionalized structure
that runs many di®erent lines of business as the conglomerate ¯rm does. This implies
that there are no bene¯ts from this type of diversi¯cation, but ¯rms have better to
focus their activity in order to exploit the gains from specialization. How come then
that we observe conglomerates?
In the literature there are several explanations as to why ¯rms diversify, although
there are no synergies. Many of these explanations are not consistent with the e±cient
use of resources and some of them are not even consistent with pro¯t maximization.
One explanation o®ered is for example that managers are empire builders, and there-
fore ¯rms with separation between ownership and control will be too diversi¯ed.2
However, when capital markets are imperfect, ¯rm diversi¯cation may add value.
For instance, from the literature on ¯nancial intermediation we know that diversi¯ca-
tion is the mean through which intermediaries can provide liquidity and information
services to investors.3
The aim of this paper is to explain the role of conglomerates as a solution to
information problems in the capital market. We show that ¯rm diversi¯cation may
be bene¯cial although it gives rise to agency costs. In a context where entrepreneurs
have the ability to run projects and to improve the future cash °ow of projects by
exercising e®ort, but have no capital to start the projects, valuable projects might not
1See Brealey and Myers (1991), Chap.33, pp.854-856 for a discussion of the principle of value
additivity of mergers between ¯rms.
2See as a reference Jensen (1986) and Shleifer and Vishny (1989). Li and Li (1996) show in
a model with empire building managers that diversi¯cation can be bene¯cial as it increases the
e®ectiviness of debt as a bonding device.
3The standard references are Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Diamond (1984). Also in the
¯nancial intermediation literature, however, there are arguments against diversi¯cation. One is
that specialization in monitoring similar projects adds value. See for instance Hellwig (1998) for a
discussion of the trade-o® between specialization and diversi¯cation. In Winton (1999) diversi¯cation
can be bad when projects in di®erent sectors are subject to correlated shocks.
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be funded. This rationing occurs as there is moral hazard between the entrepreneur,
who runs the project, and external investors, because they do not observe the e®ort
choice of the entrepreneur.
It has been shown that diversi¯cation by a borrower, debt ¯nanced, increases
the borrower's incentive to exert e®ort.4 The intuition is that debt makes the agent
residual claimant in all states except in bankruptcy and the probability of bankruptcy
decreases with diversi¯cation. As a matter of fact in some cases non-risky debt
maximizes the incentive by the agent exercising the e®ort. However for a single
entrepreneur running many di®erent projects might be increasingly costly due to
overload. In other words if limited attention implies that the time spent on each
single project a®ects the time available for the other projects, overload costs might
become important. Thus a single entrepreneur might not be able to diversify as much
as he would like, if he is going to run all the projects himself.
In this paper we show that delegating the running of projects to several managers
can keep overload costs down, although it introduces agency costs, as there is need
to monitor the e®orts of the managers. Hence, separation of ownership and control
arises in response to overload costs. As a matter of fact, a wealthy entrepreneur, who
does not need external ¯nance and thus does not diversify, but have capital enough
to ¯nance a large number of projects, will indeed delegate the running of projects to
managers because this allows to better exploit his managerial skill.
A self-¯nanced entrepreneur will only delegate the running of projects to managers
when overload costs are large compared to agency costs. However, an entrepreneur
that need external ¯nance has stronger incentives to delegate. First of all, the en-
trepreneur may be forced to diversify to be able to raise external ¯nance and del-
egation can be the key ingredient to be able to diversify. Secondly, we show that
delegation reduces the moral hazard problem of external ¯nance. In the paper we
show that under some circumstances, building a conglomerate is the only solution to
overcome asymmetry of information in capital markets.5
Our paper thus suggests that we should not worry too much about the agency
costs of conglomerates, as they come with the solution of the asymmetric information
¯nancing problem. What we should analyze are instead the ways to exploit the gains
from diversi¯cation. Conglomerates are one possible way to exploit these gains when
overload costs prove to be important.
Cross-subsidization within conglomerates has attracted lot of attention, and the
4See Cerasi and Daltung (2000) for a proof of this result in a context where an intermediary
has to exerce an unobservable e®ort in monitoring several projects. This result hinges on the
e®ort choice not being observable to investors. Boot and Schmeits (2000) show that, if there is a
positive probability that the e®ort choice will be observable to investors, there are cases in which
diversi¯cation reduces the e®ort level.
5The idea that diversi¯cation adds value only when there is separation of ownership and control
is also in Markides and Williamson (1996). However they focus on economies of scope, while we
concentrate on the bene¯ts of delegation for external ¯nance.
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common opinion seems to be that there is misallocation of funds inside the conglomerate.6
This paper shows that cross-subsidization among subsidiaries in a conglomerate actu-
ally is bene¯cial when it allows the ¯rm to make more credible promises to investors
and thereby to reduce the moral hazard in external ¯nancing.
There is evidence that conglomerates trade, on average, at a discount relative to
a portfolio of single-segment ¯rms in the same industries7. This has been taken as
evidence that conglomerates are not pro¯table. However, this paper shows that con-
glomerates can be a solution to information problems in the capital market. Firms'
head-quarters provide information services to investors, i.e. head-quarters monitor
managers of the di®erent divisions within the same conglomerate on behalf of in-
vestors. Thus the return of the conglomerate's shares should actually be lower com-
pared to the return on equity in ¯rms where the investors have to do the monitoring
by themselves.
Our paper is related to the literature on multiple agents within the principal-agent
literature.8 In contrast to this literature, however, we have two moral hazard layers.
The paper is in fact closely related to Quian (1994), where incentives are studied in
order to ¯nd the optimal hierarchical structure in ¯rms with delegation. There are
two aspects in common: the ¯rst is the idea that the larger the span of control of
onfs
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case of self-¯nanced entrepreneurs as it helps to reduce the moral hazard between
entrepreneurs and investors. Finally in section 5 we show that, when overload costs
are too high for a diversi¯ed entrepreneur to be able to raise any external funding,
delegating the task of running the projects to managers inside the ¯rm can make the
¯rm viable, thus explaining the rise of conglomerates.
2 The setup
Consider a one-period economy in which risk-neutral agents are endowed with di®er-
ent amounts of capital. There are two types of investment technology in the economy.
There is a safe constant-return technology which requires capital and returns y per
unit of capital. There are also indivisible projects which require capital and some
management skill. Each project requires an initial input of one unit of capital. An
agent must run the project in order for it to return anything. There are two types
of agent in the economy; entrepreneurs who have the ability to run projects, and
investors, who do not have this ability. We assume that there are in¯nitely many
projects in the economy, but that there is a limited number of entrepreneurs so that
management skill is a scarce resource in the economy. Therefore the total endowment
of capital exceeds the total number of projects seeking ¯nance.
Project cash °ows are assumed to be stochastic and independently distributed.
The expected return of a speci¯c project depends on how much e®ort the entrepreneur
puts into the project. Each project returns R in case of success and 0 in case of failure.
The probability of success of the project, p; depends on the e®ort level, e; according
to the following function:
p(e) ´ pL + e¢p (= pH ¡ (1 ¡ e)¢p ) ;
where ¢p ´ pH ¡ pL > 0 and e 2 [0; 1]: By putting e®ort into the project the
entrepreneur can increase the probability of success of the project from pL. If the
project is badly run, that is if the entrepreneur does not exert any e®ort, the prob-
ability of success is pL, but if the entrepreneur puts enough e®ort into the project
(e = 1) it will with certainty have the highest probability of success, pH .
We assume that only properly run projects are worth ¯nancing, while without
e®ort the net present value of the project is negative, that is:
Assumption 1 pLR < y:
Assume that e®ort is costly to the entrepreneur and that the marginal cost of
e®ort is increasing. Moreover, one entrepreneur can run several projects, but the
e®ort cost is increasing more than proportionally with the number of projects, due to
overload. This cost structure is captured by the following cost function
c(e) =
c1
2
nP
i=1
e2i +
c2
2
nP
i=1
P
j 6=i
eiej;
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where e = fe1; :::; eng is a vector of e®orts, n is the number of projects run by the
entrepreneur, and c1 and c2 are positive parameters. A strictly positive value of
c2 implies that the marginal cost of running a particular project increases with the
number of projects run by the entrepreneur. Furthermore, it implies that increasing
the e®ort put into the running of one project does not only increase the marginal cost
of running that speci¯c project, but also the marginal cost of running all the other
projects. Hence, when c2 > 0 there are overload costs.
We assume that:
Assumption 2 ¢pR > c1:
This implies that the social marginal return from e®ort exceeds the social marginal
cost of e®ort for any e®ort level when the entrepreneur runs one project alone. We
also assume that:
Assumption 3 pHR ¡ y ¡ c12 > 0:
This assumption implies that the project is socially valuable.
Finally, we assume that e®ort levels are not observable to outsiders. An en-
trepreneur, however, can use his management skill to ¯nd out the true probability of
success of a project run by another entrepreneur. We assume that if the entrepreneur
spends m units of e®ort on monitoring a project, he will ¯nd out with probability m
the expected return of the project. The e®ort cost of monitoring is assumed to be
the same as the e®ort cost of running a project.10 The key assumption, however, is
that monitoring more than one project is increasingly costly for the same reason as
running more than one project.
We would like to study the incentives of owners of ¯rms to diversify and delegate
the running of projects to managers and how this incentive is a®ected by the ¯nan-
cial structure of the ¯rm. Let us ¯rst consider, as a benchmark, the incentives of
entrepreneurs who have enough inside capital to be able to run their projects without
seeking external ¯nance.
3 The incentive to delegate in self-¯nanced ¯rms
As management skill is a scarce resource in the economy, entrepreneurs can earn
rents on running projects. Therefore, an entrepreneur may want to run more than
10There are two justi¯cations for this. First, if there was to be a di®erence between the two
costs, running a project would be presumably more costly than monitoring somebody else running
the project. But since the paper wants to discuss the bene¯ts of delegating the running activity
to managers, our assumption is conservative. Secondly, to monitor a project the agent must have
had some experience in running some other projects himself to be able to understand the quality of
a speci¯c project and make forecast on the cash °ow. Thus, monitoring a project embodies some
initial learning cost which is likely to be larger than the monitoring cost.
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one project although it involves overload costs. Since there is an unlimited number of
projects in the economy, an entrepreneur can carry out as many projects as he wants.
In this section we discuss the benchmark case of an entrepreneur who is going to
¯nance the projects himself. We will also discuss whether self-¯nanced entrepreneurs
prefer to run the projects on their own or to delegate the task of running the projects
to managers. Given the assumed cost structure, each single entrepreneur might ¯nd
too costly to run several projects on his own. Thus he might ¯nd pro¯table to delegate
the running of projects to managers in order to avoid overload costs. On the other
hand however delegation involves agency costs as the manager faces a moral hazard
problem due to the private cost of e®ort. Therefore the answer will depend upon the
balance between overload costs and agency costs.
3.1 The self-¯nanced entrepreneur
We ¯rst de¯ne as a benchmark the optimal number of projects that a wealthy en-
trepreneur would like to undertake given that he is going to ¯nance and run the
projects himself. From Assumption 3 it follows that the entrepreneur will at least
run one project. Since there are many more projects than entrepreneurs, it could be
optimal for the entrepreneur to run more than one project in spite of overload costs.
The entrepreneur chooses the optimal number of projects in order to maximize
nX
i=1
pi(ei)R ¡ ny ¡ c(e);
where e = fe1;:::eng is the vector of e®orts of running projects and pi(ei) ´ pH ¡ (1¡
ei)¢p. The optimal e®ort that the entrepreneur will put into project i, when running
n projects, is given by the following ¯rst order condition (FOC):
¢pR¡ c0i(e) ¸ 0: (1)
In the symmetric equilibrium11, i.e. when ei = e for all i, the FOC becomes:
¢pR¡ ce ¸ 0; (2)
where c ´ c1 + (n¡ 1)c2 is the marginal cost of an additional unit of e®ort. Running
more than one project will eventually reduce the optimal e®ort into each project. Sub-
stituting the optimal symmetric e®ort, e¤(n); into the total pro¯ts of the entrepreneur,
we get the equilibrium pro¯t function:
¦n(e¤) = n
½
p(e¤)R¡ y ¡ c
2
(e¤)2
¾
= n ¢ ¼n(e¤); (3)
11We show in the Appendix that for c1 > c2 the only equilibrium for the choice of the e®orts is
the symmetric one.
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where ¼n(e¤) = ¦n(e
¤)
n ; the per-project pro¯t, is decreasing in the number of projects,
directly, through n, and, indirectly, through the e®ort e¤; which is decreasing in the
number of projects whenever eq.(2) is satis¯ed with equality.
By applying the Envelope Theorem, we can compute the net gain from running
an additional project for the entrepreneur's pro¯ts:12
d¦n(e¤)
dn
= ¼n(e¤) ¡ nc22 (e
¤)2: (4)
The derivative in eq.(4) can be positive or negative for n = 1 depending on the size
of overload costs. From Assumption 3 it follows that, for su±ciently small c2, the
entrepreneur may want to run more than one project. However, since e¤ eventually
decreases with n, it follows from Assumption 1 that there is a limit to the number of
projects that the entrepreneur wants to run (¼n(0) = pLR¡ y). Denote this number
by n¤: We have that n¤ decreases with c2 and that as c2 approaches zero, n¤ goes to
in¯nity.
3.2 The incentive to delegate
When overload costs are large, is it better to delegate the task of running the projects
to di®erent managers in order to limit the costs? The bene¯ts of delegation have to
be counterbalanced by the costs, because delegation introduces agency costs.
Let's analyze the case of a wealthy entrepreneur, called the owner, undertaking n
projects. The owner hires n entrepreneurs (without capital), called the managers, to
run the projects. Hence, each manager runs only one project.13
Managers must be compensated for running projects. Assume that the owner
promises to pay the same wage, w, to every manager. In order to maximize the
incentives of the manager to exert e®ort, the manager should not get any return if
the project fails or if the owner ¯nds out that he has shirked, that is if the owner
¯nds out that the manager has chosen an e®ort level, e, smaller than 1. Hence, the
manager is promised a salary w, but the owner is allowed to ¯re him without paying
anything if the project fails or if he ¯nds out that the manager has shirked.14 Given
this contract, manager i chooses his e®ort to maximize his utility
Ui = qiw ¡ c12 (ei)
2 ;
12Note that this equation holds true even when the FOC for the optimal e®ort choice is not
binding, since in that case de¤(n)=dn = 0:
13This hierarchical structure minimizes overload costs. We discuss further this assumption in the
conclusions.
14We assume that the principal can ¯re the manager without veri¯ability of the e®orts. This
assumption ¯ts with the fact that managers are given much more risky contracts than simple workers
and thus there is no need for a good cause to ¯re a manager, while this is necessary in the case of a
worker.
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where qi = eipH+(1¡ei)(1¡mi)pL and mi is the e®ort of the owner when monitoring
the manager. If the manager chooses the e®ort level ei, with probability ei the project
will have a high expected return and the manager will get his salary if the project
succeeds. With probability (1 ¡ ei) the project will have a low expected return and
the manager gets the salary when the project succeeds only if the owner does not
¯nd out the true expected return of the project. Whether or not the owner learns
the expected return of the project depends on how much e®ort, mi, he puts into
monitoring this project. With probability (1 ¡ mi) the owner will not be able to
verify that the expected return of the project is low, and the manager gets his salary
if the project succeeds. The FOC for the manager's e®ort choice, that is his incentive
compatibility (IC) constraint is:
(¢p+mipL)w ¡ c1ei = 0: (5)
Hence, monitoring by the owner will increase the incentive of the manager to put
e®ort into the project.15 Whether the IC constraint of the manager is binding will
depend on the salary. The pro¯t of the owner in the delegation case will always
be lower if the IC constraint of the manager does not bind than if it binds, since a
non-binding constraint means that the salary could be reduced without reducing the
expected return of the project. We will consider the case in which the manager's IC
constraint is binding.16
Since each manager is paid out of the return of his project, there is no cross-
subsidization between projects. This means that the managers could either run in-
dependent ¯rms or be division managers within the same ¯rm; there is no di®erence
between these two cases. Hence, the owner can either own n small ¯rms or one large
¯rm. In other words, the owner has no incentive to set up a conglomerate, although
there are no costs from doing it. This, as we will show, is di®erent with respect to
the case of an owner who needs to raise external ¯nance. In that case the owner will
indeed have incentive to build a conglomerate, even under the assumption that he
pays all managers the same salary.
Let us now examine the incentive of the owner to monitor the managers. We
assume that the owner, once he has monitored the project, is in full control of the
new manager hired to continue the project after the ¯rst has been ¯red. In order
to simplify formulas we assume that this new manager is paid the same wage of all
other managers.17 The expected return of the owner running n projects can thus be
15This framework borrows from Aghion and Tirole (1997) the idea that the e®orts of the owner
and the manager in°uence each others and that both e®orts are essential for the project. In our
model however the two e®orts are complements, while in their model they are substitutes.
16The salary depends on the market for managers. The manager's IC constraint will bind if
there are su±ciently many managers around for there not to be any competition for managers.
Delegation could of course be more expensive if there is shortage of managers so that managers have
some bargaining power.
17This assumption is actually making delegation more costly. One could just assume that this
Diversi¯cation and Delegation 11
written as:
nX
i=1
pdi (ei;mi)(R¡ w) ¡ ny ¡ c(m); (6)
where m = fm1;:::mng is the vector of monitoring e®orts and pdi (ei;mi) = pH ¡ (1 ¡
ei)(1¡mi)¢p is the probability of success of project i, that depends upon the e®orts
of both the manager and the owner.
For a given salary, w, the owner chooses the monitoring e®ort for each project to
maximize pro¯ts in eq.(6). The FOCs are given by
(1 ¡ ei)¢p(R¡ w) ¡ c0i(m) ¸ 0; i = 1; ::::; n: (7)
For delegation to be feasible, w must be positive. If w = 0, it follows from eq.(5) that
ei = 0 for all i and the FOC of the owner is equivalent to that in the non-delegation
case, that is eq.(1). Hence, w = 0 can be thought of as the owner running the project
by himself. For a larger salary the owner reduces his e®ort. The interesting case is
when the FOCs of the owner are satis¯ed with equality. In this case, the owner, who
delegates the project to a manager, exerts less e®ort compared to the owner running
the project himself. Delegation is thus appealing for the owner only if he manages
to reduce his e®ort, otherwise he would prefer to save on the salary w and run the
project himself. If ei = 1, the owner has no incentive to monitor the manager. In
other words, when w is large enough, the manager runs the project with maximum
e®ort, although the owner does not monitor him at all.
Let us de¯ne the symmetric equilibrium e®orts fbe(n);cm(n)g. Thus the system of
FOCs becomes18:
(¢p+ cmpL)w ¡ c1be = 0; (8)
(1 ¡ be)¢p(R¡ w) ¡ ccm = 0: (9)
where c ´ c1 + (n¡ 1)c2: Using Cramer's rule to solve for the equilibrium e®orts, we
get:
m^ =
¢p(R ¡ w)(c1 ¡ ¢pw)
H
; (10)
e^ =
w¢p(c+ pL(R¡ w))
H
; (11)
where H ´ c1c + pLw¢p(R ¡ w): In equilibrium the e®ort levels depend upon the
salary; the e®ort of the owner decreases with the salary, while the e®ort of the manager
increases with the salary. A higher salary means that the owner can rely more on the
manager behaving, and therefore can reduce his monitoring e®ort.
manager is paid just the alternative salary, but then it could look like we were biasing the result
towards delegation.
18We focus on symmetric equilibria. It is easy to show that when c1 > c2, there is only a symmetric
equilibrium.
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Substituting the equilibrium e®orts, we derive the equilibrium pro¯ts of the owner
who delegates the running of n projects to managers, in a self-¯nanced ¯rm:
¦dn(be;cm) = n½pd(be;cm)(R¡ w) ¡ y ¡ c2(cm)2
¾
= n ¢ ¼dn(be;cm); (12)
where pd(be;cm) = pH ¡ (1 ¡ be)(1 ¡ cm)¢p is the equilibrium probability of success:
3.2.1 The focused ¯rm (n=1)
We will ¯rst discuss the incentives to delegate by the owner of a focused ¯rm. When
n = 1; the pro¯t of the owner is given by
pd(e;m)(R¡ w) ¡ y ¡ c1
2
m2;
where pd(e;m) = pH ¡ (1 ¡ e)(1 ¡ m)¢p: The owner chooses his monitoring e®ort
according to
(1 ¡ e)¢p(R¡ w) ¡ c1m = 0; (13)
while the manager according to
(¢p+mpL)w ¡ c1e = 0: (14)
There are agency costs when delegating the running of the project to a manager. This
can be illustrated as follows. Assume that the owner does not monitor the manager,
the IC constraint of the manager then would be:
¢pw ¡ c1e = 0:
Assume further that the owner pays the manager a salary which induces the same
e®ort level as that of the owner, if he were running the project himself, that is
w =
c1
¢p
e¤(1):
From Assumption 2 it follows that e¤(1) = 1: Substituting this into the pro¯t function,
we get:
¼d1(e
¤; 0) ¡ ¼1(e¤) = ¡pw + c12 : (15)
Substituting w gives
¡(pL +¢p)
¢p
c1 +
c1
2
< 0:
Due to agency costs, it is more costly for the owner to pay the manager in order to
induce him to run the project, rather than running it himself. The owner can reduce
the agency cost somewhat by monitoring the manager. We have thus the following
result:
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Proposition 1 The owner of a focused ¯rm does not want to delegate to a manager
at a salary for which the manager chooses the same e®ort of the owner, when running
the project himself.
Proof: De¯ne fe^; m^g the e®ort levels of the owner and the manager in equilibrium,
that is the solution to the system of equations (14) and (13). We will show that the
pro¯ts in delegation, ¼d1 ; are lower than the pro¯ts without delegation, ¼1; for e^ > m^:
The di®erence between the pro¯ts can be written as:
¼d1(e^; m^) ¡ ¼1(e¤) =
·
(pL + e^¢p+ cm(1 ¡ e^)¢p)(R¡ w) ¡ y ¡ c12 cm2
¸
¡
·
(pL + e¤¢p)R¡ y ¡ c12 (e
¤)2
¸
:
The right hand side (RHS) can be rewritten as
(pL + e^¢p)(R¡ w) + cmµ(1 ¡ e^)¢p(R ¡ w) ¡ c12 cm
¶
¡
·
(pL + e¤¢p)R¡ c12 (e
¤)2
¸
:
From eq.(13) it follows that the second term is equal to c12 cm2: Using this and rear-
ranging terms gives
e^¢pR ¡ (pL + e^¢p)w + c12 cm2 ¡ e¤(¢pR¡ c12 e¤):
We will now show that
(pL + e^¢p)w > c1e^2:
Hence,
w =
c1e^
(¢p+ cmpL) ;
and we should show that
(pL + e^¢p)
c1e^
(¢p+ cmpL) > c1e^2:
By multiplying both sides by ¢p+bmpLc1e^ and subtracting e^¢p we get
pL > e^cmpL
which indeed holds true, since e^ and m^ cannot be both equal to one simultaneously.
Hence we have that
¼d1(e^; m^) ¡ ¼1(e¤) < e^¢pR¡ c1e^2 + c12 cm2 ¡ e¤(¢pR¡ c12 e¤):
Rewriting the RHS, we have that
¼d1(e^; m^) ¡ ¼1(e¤) <
·
e^(¢pR¡ c1
2
e^) ¡ e¤(¢pR¡ c1
2
e¤)
¸
+
·c1
2
cm2 ¡ c1
2
e^2
¸
: (16)
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We have that the ¯rst term of the RHS is non-positive, since e(¢pR¡ c12 e) is increasing
in e for all e < e¤and equal to zero for e = e¤, and indeed e^ · e¤: Also the second
term is negative if e^ > m^: Q.E.D
Hence, we can conclude that the owner of a focused ¯rm does not want to pay a
manager for doing most of the job running the project. This is not surprising, since
delegation introduces an agency cost for the owner. However, we can show that the
bene¯ts of delegation are potentially larger in a ¯rm that undertakes many projects
when the owner faces overload costs. As pointed out, delegation allows the owner to
reduce the e®ort into each project and to substitute his own e®ort with the manager's
e®ort. This may indeed reduce costs, since the manager does not face any overload
costs. Let us therefore consider the case in which the ¯rm invests in several projects,
that is when n > 1:
3.2.2 The unfocused ¯rm (n>1)
Let us discuss whether an owner of an unfocused ¯rm would like to delegate. We will
¯rst show that the incentive to delegate is larger in a unfocused ¯rm compared to
a focused ¯rm. We will also show that there are cases in which the owner actually
wants to delegate despite internal agency costs arising from the delegated structure.
Then we will argue that a hierarchial structure allows the owner to increase the size
of the ¯rm, therefore exploiting better his management skill.
Proposition 2 The owner of a unfocused ¯rm has larger incentives to delegate com-
pared to the owner of a focused ¯rm.
Proof: Assume that the owner gives the managers a salary such that
w =
c1
¢p
e¤(n); (17)
where e¤(n) is the e®ort level chosen by the owner when running the projects himself
given in eq.(2). Assume that n is large enough for eq.(2) to be ful¯lled with equality.
Then we have
e¤(n) =
¢pR
c
:
If the owner does not monitor the managers, substituting the salary in eq.(17) into
the IC constraint of the manager, eq.(5), implies that each manager will choose the
e®ort level e¤. Then the di®erence in pro¯ts per-project can be written as
¼dn(e
¤; 0) ¡ ¼n(e¤) = ¡pw + c2 (e
¤)2 :
Substituting w; gives
¼dn(e
¤; 0) ¡ ¼n(e¤) = ¡(pL +¢pe
¤)
¢p
c1e¤ +
c
2
(e¤)2 ;
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which is equal to
e¤
Ã
¡ pL
¢p
c1 ¡ c1e¤ + 12ce
¤
!
: (18)
The owner has incentive to delegate whenever the term within the parentheses is
positive. Since, according to eq.(2), ce¤ = ¢pR for any n su±ciently large for the
FOC of the owner to be binding, and since e¤ decreases with n; the term within the
parentheses increases with n. Q.E.D.
Through delegation, the owner can save on overload costs. This bene¯t increases
with the size of the ¯rm. Now, we will show that there are parameter values for which
the owner indeed wants to delegate.
Let us discuss whether the owner would like to delegate, when the number of
projects is the optimal number of projects, n¤; in the previous section. If he would
like to delegate in that case, a fortiori he certainly would like to delegate if he were
allowed to freely choose the number of projects. We postpone the discussion about
the optimal number of projects in this case. Before we have assumed that the owner
does not monitor at all the managers. However, the owner might want to monitor the
managers, although monitoring involves overload costs, as he could reduce the salary.
Now we will show that there are conditions under which delegation dominates
non-delegation.
Proposition 3 There are parameter values for which an entrepreneur would ¯nd
optimal to delegate the running of projects to managers.
Proof: Consider the following numerical example:
R = 3; pH = 0:7; pL = 0:3; y = 1; c1 = 0:25; c2 = 0:05; n = 20:
Substituting the parameter values into the FOC of an owner who runs the projects
himself given by eq.(2) gives, for a binding condition, e¤ = 1: This in turns implies
a probability of success for each project p¤ = 0:7. The portfolio return is p¤R = 2:1;
larger than y, so the entrepreneur would prefer to run projects rather than investing in
the safe alternative asset. Notice that n¤ = 20 is the optimal number of projects that
maximizes pro¯ts in eq.(4). The maximum pro¯ts of the owner are then ¦20(e¤) = 10:
However, if the owner delegates the running of projects he could do better. For
instance, this is true when the salary is 0:25. Substituting the parameter values into
eq.(10) and (11) for n¤ = 20; gives cm = 0:22034 and be = 0:74576; which in turns
implies a probability of success p^d = 0:62071: This means that the average portfolio
return net of salaries, bpd(R¡w) = 1:6139; is larger than y: Furthermore, if the owner
delegates the running of the projects to 20 managers he can earn ¦d20(be;cm) = 11:694 >
10. Since the manager gets at least his reservation utility, that is Ui(be) = :16308 > 0;
this solution is feasible and the owner would prefer it to running the n¤ = 20 projects
on his own. Q.E.D.
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This result depends upon the fact that e®ort costs are increasing in the number
of projects and that delegating allows the owner to reduce overload costs. However,
delegation introduces agency costs so that this result holds true whenever overload
costs overcome internal agency costs.
Notice that in this speci¯c example, when n = 1 it turns out that the e®ort of the
manager is larger than the monitoring e®ort of the owner, that is be = 0:87987 > cm =
0:49973: In the previous subsection, we have shown that the owner would not like to
delegate when running only one project. Still, the above Proposition holds true; thus
the gains from delegation increase with the number of projects.
In the numerical example, the bene¯ts of delegation come through the savings on
overload costs, since the owner monitors less compared to the e®ort he has to exercise
when he runs the project himself. Delegation could also be bene¯cial as, under some
conditions, it increases the overall probability of success of each project.
Proposition 4 When the entrepreneur, running the project himself, chooses an e®ort
level smaller than 0.5, delegation increases the probability of success of the project.
Proof: When delegating, the probability of success is pd(e;m) = pH ¡ (1¡ e)(1¡
m)¢p: Substituting from eq.(9), it follows that the equilibrium probability of success
for each project can be written as:
bpd(be;cm) = pH ¡ c¢p(R¡ w)cm(1 ¡ cm)¢p:
We have that cm = e¤ for w = 0, that is when w = 0 the owner chooses the same e®ort
level as if he were running the project himself. Since cm decreases with the salary, and
m(1¡m) reaches its maximum for m = 12 ; it follows that bpd increases monotonically
with the salary when the owner, running the projects himself, exercises an e®ort level
smaller than 0:5. Q.E.D
Thus, when the owner runs several projects, putting little e®ort into each of
them due to overload, he would have even stronger incentives to delegate. Moreover,
the owner might want to ¯nance a larger number of projects compared to the non-
delegation equilibrium. We have in fact that:
d¦dn(e^; m^)
dn
= ¼dn(e^; m^) ¡ nc22 m^
2 + n(1 ¡ m^)¢p(R¡ w) de^
dn
: (19)
The sum of the ¯rst two terms in eq.(19) is larger than the derivative of the pro¯ts in
the non-delegation case given by eq.(4), whenever the owner prefers to delegate, for a
given number of projects. The last term in eq.(19), however, is negative. Increasing
the number of projects reduces monitoring by the owner and therefore the e®ort of the
manager. Hence we cannot generally conclude that the owner would like to ¯nance
more projects when delegating. However, in the numerical example in Proposition 3
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the owner would indeed like to do so. For instance if the owner hires one thousand
managers, his pro¯ts will be equal to 450: 65 compared to 11:694; the pro¯ts when
running 20 projects. Actually, in this case the projects are so pro¯table that the owner
could pay the managers a salary high enough for each of them to put maximum e®ort
into the project, even if the owner is not monitoring at all, and still earn a positive
pro¯t for each project. In this case the last two terms in eq.(19) are equal to zero so
that the derivative is positive for any n:
To conclude this section, without external ¯nance, the bene¯ts of delegation are
in the reduction of overload costs, due to the fact that the e®ort of the owner is
lower than in the non-delegation case. In addition in some cases delegation increases
the probability of success of the project. Hence, separation of ownership and control
arises endogenously as optimal response to overload costs, although it involves agency
costs.
However, when a ¯rm has to raise external ¯nance, we can show that delegation
adds a further bene¯t in that it reduces the moral hazard between the owner and
his ¯nanciers. Furthermore, we will show that externally ¯nanced ¯rms might have
to diversify more in order to be able to attract outside capital, reinforcing thus the
incentive to delegate as the number of projects increases. Hence, external ¯nancing
might force the owner to give up some degree of control to managers.
4 The scope for diversi¯cation and delegation in
externally ¯nanced ¯rms
Assume that entrepreneurs have no capital at all, while investors do, and that there
are many investors. Entrepreneurs who do not have capital on their own, will try
to use their essential management skill to raise funds from investors. However, since
e®orts are non observable to investors, managerial e®ort is non contractible. Because
of limited liability19 and unobservability of e®orts, there is moral hazard between the
entrepreneur and investors, although observability and veri¯ability of project returns.
In other words, external ¯nance reduces the incentive of the entrepreneur, since part
of the bene¯ts of increased e®ort accrues to investors.
In Cerasi and Daltung (2000) we have shown that diversi¯cation reduces the moral
hazard problem when the ¯rm is debt ¯nanced. In the next section we will show that
externally ¯nanced entrepreneurs might want to diversify more compared to self-
¯nanced entrepreneurs. In the previous section we have shown that delegation may
help increasing the overall performance of the entrepreneur's portfolio of projects by
19Since the entrepreneur has no capital of his own, he cannot promise to return to investors more
income than what his project returns. He cannot commit to deliver anything in the future, given
that all the agents live for one period alone, and physical punishments are not allowed. Hence, the
entrepreneur has limited liability.
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reducing overload costs. Delegation can be helpful in externally ¯nanced ¯rms in
two ways: ¯rst of all, because diversi¯cation, although it strengthen the incentive
problem of the owner, it is costly to achieve due to overload costs, delegation can be
bene¯cial as the overload costs of the owner are reduced; secondly, because delegation,
as we will show in section 4.2, reduces the moral hazard of external ¯nance, it adds
a further bene¯t in addition to those already discussed in the section on self-¯nanced
¯rms. Could then be that delegation alone helps alleviating the incentive problem of
external ¯nancing? In section 5 we show that both diversi¯cation and delegation can
be necessary ingredients for the ¯rm to become viable.
4.1 The scope for diversi¯cation
From Cerasi and Daltung (2000) we know that if overload costs are not too high
the entrepreneur can commit to a higher e®ort by increasing the diversi¯cation of the
portfolio by adding non-correlated projects, given that the contract with the investors
is a debt contract. For this result to hold true the debt contract must be conditioned
on the return of the portfolio of projects, allowing thus cross-subsidization among
projects. Let us therefore consider the case in which the entrepreneur establishes one
¯rm which issues one-period debt contracts. The entrepreneur is in fact the owner of
this ¯rm, since he is entitled to the residual income. This provides him with incentives
to exert e®ort.
The pro¯ts of an entrepreneur, who owns and runs a debt-¯nanced ¯rm consisting
of n projects can be written as:
nP
i=1
p(ei)R¡ [nrD ¡ Sn(e)] ¡ c(e); (20)
where rD is the promised gross return per unit of capital and Sn are the expected
shortfalls on the total debt, that is the di®erence in expected terms between the
promised amount, nrD, and the amount recovered by the ¯nanciers when the en-
trepreneur fails to repay nrD. The expected shortfalls depend upon the promised
return on debt and upon the vector of e®orts by the entrepreneur, e, through the
expected returns of the projects.
For each project, the entrepreneur chooses the e®ort so as to maximize pro¯ts:
¢pR+
@Sn
@ei
¡ c0(ei) ¸ 0; i = 1; ::::; n: (21)
The moral hazard problem comes through the impact of a change in the e®ort level on
the expected shortfalls. This term is negative, as a reduction in the e®ort increases
the expected shortfalls. The entrepreneur exploits the fact that investors cannot
observe an increase in the expected shortfalls due to lower e®ort, as e®ort levels are
not observable.
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For the entrepreneur to be able to fund the projects, the promised return to
investors per unit of capital must satisfy the individual rationality (IR) constraint:20
rD ¡ 1nSn(e) = y: (22)
Hence, if there is an equilibrium, the equilibrium pro¯t function of the owner looks like
the pro¯t function of the self-¯nanced entrepreneur. De¯ne the symmetric equilibrium
e®ort e0 for all e: The pro¯ts of the owner can be written as:
¦n(e0) = n
½
p(e0)R¡ y ¡ c
2
(e0)2
¾
= n ¢ ¼n(e0): (23)
According to the Law of Large Numbers, the probability that the average portfolio
return is equal to the expected project return approaches one, as n goes to in¯nity.
Hence, if the expected project return is larger than the promised return to investors,
the probability that the average portfolio return will be smaller than the promised
return, per unit invested, approaches zero. That is, the expected shortfalls approach
zero as n goes to in¯nity. Intuitively the derivative of the expected shortfalls with
respect to the e®ort approaches zero as well. The amount by which an increase in
the e®ort level could reduce the probability of default is limited by the size of the
probability of default, as the probability cannot be less than zero. Hence, as the prob-
ability of default approaches zero, so does the derivative of the expected shortfalls.21
Therefore, if the average expected portfolio return is larger than the promised return
on debt, the IC constraint of a perfectly diversi¯ed owner corresponds to eq.(1). Fur-
thermore, the FOC for optimal e®ort choice of the self-¯nanced entrepreneur, and
the promised return, rD, will be equal to the alternative return, y. By establishing a
single perfectly diversi¯ed ¯rm the owner can always ful¯ll his promise to repay the
debt. If he instead were to own n independent ¯rms, he would fail to pay his debt in
about (1 ¡ p0) ¤ n ¯rms.
We will now show that in a symmetric equilibrium, the owner of an externally ¯-
nanced ¯rmmight want to diversify more compared to the self-¯nanced entrepreneur.22
Taking the derivative of the pro¯t function in eq.(23) with respect to n gives
d¦n(e0)
dn
= ¼n(e0) ¡ nc22 (e
0)2 + n (¢pR¡ ce0) de
0
dn
: (24)
The ¯rst two terms correspond to the terms in eq.(4). However, since the owner, due
to moral hazard, is not choosing the e®orts to maximize the pro¯ts in eq.(23), the
20We assume that the supply of capital exceeds the demand so that there is no competition for
capital. Hence, investors will only earn the alternative return.
21This is shown for the case of the normal distribution in Cerasi and Daltung (2000).
22It could be that there are other solutions rather than the symmetric one, when the ¯rm is
externally ¯nanced and not perfectly diversi¯ed. We are however restricting the analysis to the
symmetric equilibrium.
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Envelope Theorem does not apply, and there is an additional term. Due to moral
hazard the equilibrium e®ort of the externally ¯nanced entrepreneur, e0, is less than
the e®ort of the self-¯nanced entrepreneur, e¤; as long as the entrepreneur is not
perfectly diversi¯ed. The derivative of the ¯rst two terms in eq.(19) is equal to
¢pR¡ ce0 ¡ nc2e0;
which is negative for nc2 su±ciently large. In that case, the ¯rst two terms are larger
than d¦n(e
¤)
dn , as e
0 < e¤: According to the IC constraint of the owner, eq.(21) ¢pR¡ce0
is positive, if the ¯rm is not perfectly diversi¯ed. If overload costs are positive, but
not too high, also de
0
dn will be larger than zero, since the derivative of the expected
shortfalls decreases with n. In this case, the owner of an externally ¯nanced ¯rm has
incentive to choose number of projects larger than n¤, as diversi¯cation reduces his
moral hazard problem. However, for larger overload costs an increase in the number
of projects may actually reduce the e®ort of the owner. In that case diversi¯cation
alone cannot resolve the moral hazard problem of the owner.
4.2 Bene¯ts of delegation in externally ¯nanced ¯rms
We have seen that diversi¯cation can be a way to reduce moral hazard of the owner.
From section 3 we know that the incentive to delegate increases with the size of
the ¯rm. However, we would like to show that there is an additional incentive to
delegate when the ¯rm is debt ¯nanced, namely that delegation reduces the moral
hazard connected to external ¯nancing. In order to disentangle the two bene¯ts of
delegation, we ¯rst study an entrepreneur who tries to raise funds from investors in
order to ¯nance just one project.
4.2.1 The focused ¯rm (n=1)
Consider ¯rst the case in which the entrepreneur runs the project himself. The
entrepreneur promises to pay rD to his ¯nanciers when the project succeeds. We can
think of rD as a gross return on the debt issued by the ¯rm. However, for the focused
¯rm, because of the simple distribution of the returns of the project it could as well
be the gross return on shares. For the unfocused ¯rm, however, debt and equity
contracts are not equivalent.
Investors accept to ¯nance the project if and only if the expected return is larger
than the safe return of the alternative technology, that is if the following IR condition
is satis¯ed:
p(e)rD = y:
Investors are assumed to have rational expectations. Hence, they expect the en-
trepreneur to choose the e®ort level that maximizes his expected pro¯ts,
p(e)(R¡ rD) ¡ c12 e
2:
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The FOC is given by
¢p(R¡ rD) ¡ c1e ¸ 0: (25)
The moral hazard comes through the term ¢prD. Once rD is given, the entrepreneur
has lower incentives to increase his e®ort in the project as the gains are partly appro-
priated by the ¯nanciers, while the cost is only on the entrepreneur shoulders. We
have that if
pHR¡ y ¡ pH¢pc1 < 0; (26)
the moral hazard problem will lead an externally ¯nanced entrepreneur to choose an
e®ort level smaller than 1: In this case, the information problem gives rise to a moral
hazard problem.
When delegating the task of running the project to a manager, the pro¯ts of the
owner are given by:
pd(e;m)RN ¡ c1
2
m2;
where pd(e;m) = pH ¡ (1 ¡ e)(1 ¡m)¢p and RN ´ (R ¡ w ¡ rD): Given the face
value of debt, rD, the owner chooses his monitoring e®ort according to the FOC:
(1 ¡ e)¢pRN ¡ c1m = 0: (27)
We can now show that the incentives to delegate are larger in the externally ¯nanced
¯rm compared to the case of self-¯nanced ¯rm.
Proposition 5 In a focused ¯rm an externally ¯nanced entrepreneur has more in-
centive to delegate than a self-¯nanced entrepreneur.
Proof: Consider a self-¯nanced owner of a focused ¯rm. From Assumption 2 it
follows that this owner will choose the maximum e®ort level, that is e¤(1) = 1: An
owner of an externally ¯nanced focused ¯rm will however, due to moral hazard, choose
an e®ort level smaller than 1. Let the owner of the externally ¯nanced ¯rm hire a
manager and pay him a salary such that the manager chooses to exert maximum e®ort.
If the owner does not monitor the manager the di®erence in per project equilibrium
pro¯ts can be written as
¼d1(e
¤; 0) ¡ ¼1(e0) = (pH ¡ p0)R¡ pHw + c12 (e
0)2 ;
where p0 = pL + e0¢p; and e0 is the e®ort level chosen by the externally ¯nanced
entrepreneur when there is a moral hazard problem. The right hand side can be
rewritten as
¡pHw + c12 + (pH ¡ p
0)R+
c1
2
³
(e0)2 ¡ 1´ :
The ¯rst two terms are the same as in eq.(15), that is in the case of a self-¯nanced
focused ¯rm. We will now show that the sum of the last two terms is positive, in
which case the incentive to delegate is larger in the externally ¯nanced ¯rm.
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We have that
(pH ¡ p0)R + c12
³
(e0)2 ¡ 1´ = (1 ¡ e0)¢pR¡ ³1 ¡ (e0)2´ c1
2
=
(1 ¡ e0)
·
¢pR¡ (1 + e0)c1
2
¸
;
that is positive when Assumption 2 holds true. Q.E.D.
The reason why the externally ¯nanced entrepreneur has a larger incentive to
delegate is because delegation reduces the moral hazard of the owner. This e®ect
can be seen from the IC constraint of the owner. The moral hazard of the owner is
captured by the derivative of the expected shortfall with respect to e®ort,
¡¢prD
in eq. (25). The corresponding derivative with delegation is
¡(1 ¡ e)¢prD:
Delegation reduces the moral hazard, since the impact of a reduction in e®ort by the
owner on the expected shortfall is now mitigated by the fact that the probabiblity of
success now also depends on the e®ort of the manager. Notice, however, that when
eq.(26) is satisifed, that is when the owner faces a moral hazard problem, R is not
large enough for a salary to exist, such that the manager chooses to put maximum
e®ort into the project. Hence, the moral hazard problem of external ¯nancing cannot
be eliminated through delegation.
4.2.2 The unfocused ¯rm (n>1)
Let us now analyze the bene¯ts of delegation when the ¯rm undertakes n > 1
projects. Because of overload costs, it is costly for one entrepreneur alone to run
several projects. In section 3 we have shown that delegating the running of projects
to other agents can be a way to keep costs down. In section 4.1 we showed that
the externally ¯nanced entrepreneur has incentive to diversify more than the self-
¯nanced entrepreneur, and hence should have stronger incentive to delegate than the
self-¯nanced entrepreneur. Then we showed in the previous section that the exter-
nally ¯nanced entrepreneur has additional reasons to delegate, as delegation reduces
his moral hazard problem with investors.
The stronger incentive to diversify of the externally ¯nanced entrepreneur only
arises if the entrepreneur establishes one diversi¯ed ¯rm. When the entrepreneur is
self-¯nanced there are no bene¯ts from setting up a conglomerate. The entrepreneur
could equivalently own n independent ¯rms. When the ¯rm is externally ¯nanced,
the entrepreneur may indeed have incentive to set up a conglomerate.
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Consider an entrepreneur who owns a single ¯rm. The ¯rm hires n managers to
run n projects paying each manager a salary w.23 The owner monitors the managers.
As before, the ¯rm is assumed to issue debt. Let us assume that managers are senior
with respect to investors.24 The owner will be residual claimant of the ¯rm's returns,
which provides him with the incentive to monitor the managers.
Let us now examine the incentive of the owner to monitor the managers. Given
the above assumptions the expected return of the owner can be written as:
nX
i=1
pdi (ei;mi)(R¡ w) ¡
h
nrD ¡ Sdn(e;m)
i ¡ c(m); (28)
where pdi (ei;mi) = pH ¡ (1 ¡ ei)(1 ¡mi)¢p is the probability of success of project i,
and Sdn(e;m) are the expected shortfalls on debt, that is the di®erence in expected
terms between the promised amount, nrD, and the amount recovered by the ¯nanciers
when the entrepreneur fails to repay nrD. The expected shortfalls depend now on
both the vector of e®orts by the entrepreneur and the vector of e®orts by managers,
(e;m), as both are a®ecting the expected returns on projects.
For a given salary, the owner chooses the monitoring e®ort to maximize pro¯ts in
eq.(28) for each project. The FOCs are given by
(1 ¡ ei)¢p(R¡ w) + @S
d
n
@mi
¡
Ã
c1mi + c2
P
j 6=i
mi
!
= 0; i = 1; ::::; n: (29)
As before the derivative of the expected shortfalls with respect to e®orts captures
the moral hazard problem of the owner. This term is negative, as a reduction in
the e®ort increases the expected shortfalls. The entrepreneur exploits the fact that
investors cannot observe an increase in the expected shortfalls, as the e®ort level is not
observable. However, as for the focused ¯rm, the e®ect on the shortfall is mitigated
by the fact that also the manager puts e®ort into the project, that is the absolute
value of @S
d
n
@mi
decreases with e:
From eq.(5) we get the FOCs of the managers:
(¢p+mipL)w ¡ c1ei = 0; i = 1; ::::; n: (30)
23The contract with the manager implies that the owner pays a salary w whenever the project is
succesfull and whenever he, when monitoring, does not ¯nd out that the manager has choosen an
e®ort level smaller than 1: When the owner ¯nds out, after having spent some monitoring e®ort,
that the manager has shirked, he can ¯re him, without paying him the salary. He will instead hire
a new manager, pay him w, and make sure that he chooses the maximum e®ort. This assumption
does not require that the level of e®ort is veri¯able to third parties. It only requires to assume that
the outcome of the monitoring, whether the e®ort of the manager is smaller than 1; is veri¯able.
24Making managers senior to investors means that the wage has to be paid, before any other
creditor, out of the return of each succesfull project. Actually one would have to show that seniority
of the managers is the optimal contract from the owner's point of view.
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For given size of the ¯rm, n, and salary, w, the equilibrium is given by the solution
to the above system of equations (29),(30) and by the IR condition for investor:
rD ¡ 1nS
d
n(m; e) = y: (31)
Assume that n is su±ciently large for the ¯rm to be perfectly diversi¯ed. This means
that there are no shortfalls on debt, if the average return of the ¯rm's portfolio is
larger than the alternative return. This requires that overload costs are not too high.25
If there is an equilibrium in which the overall e®ort levels are high enough for the
¯rm to be able to reimburse its debt, this is determined by26
(¢p+mpL)w ¡ c1e = 0; (32)
(1 ¡ e)¢p(R¡ w) ¡ cm = 0; (33)
rD = y: (34)
The above system of equations is equivalent to that of a self-¯nanced entrepreneur
that delegates to managers, that is to eq.(8) and eq.(9). In Proposition 3 we have
proved that there are parameter values for which the solution to the above system is
preferred by the owner to the optimal solution without delegation. We also showed
that, for the same set of parameters, the owner wanted to undertake a larger number
of projects when delegating, so that the ¯rm indeed would be approximately perfectly
diversi¯ed.27Hence, we know that there are parameters for which the owner can do
better by delegating than in the non-delegation equilibrium.
However, the bene¯ts of delegation are potentially larger in a non-perfectly diver-
si¯ed ¯rm. First of all, in a less than perfectly diversi¯ed ¯rm, moral hazard would
reduce the e®ort of the entrepreneur. From Proposition 4, we now that if the e®ort
of the entrepreneur is smaller than 0:5, delegating will increase the overall e®ort put
into each project. Moreover, in the previous section we have proved that a focused
externally ¯nanced ¯rm has more incentives to delegate than a self-¯nanced ¯rm as
delegation improves the incentives of the owner to exert e®ort. Thus externally ¯-
nanced ¯rms might have additional bene¯ts from delegation compared to self-¯nanced
¯rms, when the ¯rm is not perfectly diversi¯ed.
In this section we have shown that, in the limit for a perfectly diversi¯ed ¯rm, we
can replicate the result in Proposition 3, namely that there are parameters value for
25From Cerasi and Daltung (2000) one can show that there exists a c^2 > 0; such that for any c2 2
[0; c^2] the incentives of a debt-¯nanced owner are equivalent to that of a self-¯nanced entrepreneur.
26As before we focus on symmetric equilibria. The reason is that, when the ¯rm is perfectly
diversi¯ed, we are back to the system of equations (5) and (7). Thus it is easy to show that if
Assumption 1 holds, there is only a symmetric equilibrium.
27We know that for the parameter values in Proposition 3, the entrepreneur would like to carry
out 1000 projects when he delegates the running of projects. Applying the Central Limit Theorem
one can show that a 1000 projects ¯rm is approximately perfectly diversi¯ed.
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which the owner would like to delegate. In the next section, we show that diversi¯ca-
tion without delegation can be too costly, so that the ¯rm cannot even raise external
¯nance. Delegation with diversi¯cation however increases the incentive to exert e®ort
of the owner without increasing overload costs too much, so that the ¯rm becomes
viable.
5 The need for both diversi¯cation and delegation
In this section we want to show that delegation can be so bene¯cial that in fact it
can be the only solution for a ¯rm in search of external ¯nance to become viable.
We will show that, although a perfectly diversi¯ed ¯rm cannot raise any external
¯nance, delegation makes the ¯rm viable. However, delegation alone is not su±cient
for the ¯rm to become viable; the ¯rm must also be diversi¯ed. Hence, building a
conglomerate could be the only way to overcome the asymmetry of information in
the capital market.
To build this argument, let's ¯rst de¯ne the conditions under which a focused
¯rm is non viable. Then we will show that delegation will not make the focused
¯rm viable. After that we will show that there are cases in which, even though a
perfectly diversi¯ed ¯rm remains non-viable, delegating the task of running projects
to managers makes this ¯rm viable. Hence both diversi¯cation and delegation are
necessary ingredients for the ¯rm to become viable.
First of all, a focused ¯rm cannot raise external ¯nance, when the following con-
dition applies:
Proposition 6 If ¢pR¡2pyc1+ c1pL¢p < 0; a focused ¯rm without own capital cannot
raise funds from investors.
Proof: A debt ¯nanced entrepreneur running just one project maximizes his pro¯ts
under the IR condition for investors
p(e)rD = y;
where e is the e®ort that investors believe the entrepreneur will put into the project.
Investors expect the entrepreneur to choose the e®ort level by maximizing his expected
pro¯ts,
p(e)(R¡ rD) ¡ c12 e
2:
where p(e) ´ pH ¡ (1 ¡ e)¢p. For a given face value of the debt contract, rD; the
entrepreneur chooses the e®ort level such that:
¢p(R¡ rD) ¡ c1e ¸ 0: (35)
Diversi¯cation and Delegation 26
Substituting rD from the IR of investors, we have that the entrepreneur cannot get
funding if
¢p(R¡ y
pH ¡ (1 ¡ e)¢p) ¡ c1e < 0; (36)
for any e 2 [0; 1] : The left hand side of eq.(36) reaches its maximum for
e =
s
y
c1
¡ pL
¢p
:
By substituting the maximum e®ort into eq.(36) we have that ¢pR¡2pyc1+ c1pL¢p < 0:
Q.E.D.
In this case the moral hazard of the owner is so severe, that a focused ¯rm is not
able to raise external funds. Let us now show that delegation alone, in a focused ¯rm,
does not help raising funds:
Proposition 7 Delegation cannot make a non-viable focused ¯rm, viable.
Proof: We will show that there exists no salary w for which the one-project ¯rm
with delegation can raise debt when the non-delegated ¯rm cannot. The equilibrium
e®ort levels are given by the solution to the system of FOCs:
(¢p+mpL)w ¡ c1e ¸ 0; (37)
(1 ¡ e)¢pRN ¡ c1m ¸ 0: (38)
where RN ´ R ¡ w ¡ rD is the net return to the entrepreneur. For investors to be
willing to ¯nance the ¯rm, they must be promised a return rD which ful¯lls
pd(e;m)rD = y; (39)
where pd(e;m) = pH ¡ (1¡ e)(1¡m)¢p: Notice that for a given rD, the e®ort levels
e and m ful¯ll respectively the FOC for the manager and the FOC for the owner.
When w = 0; the equilibrium is given by
e = 0;
¢p(R¡ rD) ¡ c1m ¸ 0;
[pH ¡ (1 ¡m)¢p] rD = y:
Then we know from the proof of the previous Proposition that there is no equilibrium.
When w = R¡ ypd , the equilibrium instead is given by
m = 0;
¢p
Ã
R¡ y
pH ¡ (1 ¡ e)¢p
!
¡ c1e ¸ 0;
[pH ¡ (1 ¡ e)¢p] rD = y:
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and again it follows directly from the proof of the previous Proposition that there is
no equilibrium.
Now we will show that also for all w such that 0 < w < R ¡ ypd , there is no
equilibrium. In this case both FOCs bind and the candidate equilibrium is given by
(¢p+mpL)w ¡ c1e = 0; (40)
(1 ¡ e)¢pRN ¡ c1m = 0; (41)
[pH ¡ (1 ¡ e)(1 ¡m)¢p] rD = y (42)
From equation (41) we get
(1 ¡ e) = c1
¢pRN
m;
and therefore pd = pH ¡ c1RNm(1 ¡m): For given rD; pd is minimized for m = 12 and
maximized either for m = 0 or m = 1: We know that there exists no equilibrium
in which m = 0 or m = 1: Since pd is smaller for 0 < m < 1; given rD, and the
equilibrium rD must be higher for lower pd, there can neither be an equilibrium in
which 0 < m < 1: Q.E.D.
Hence, to conclude, delegation cannot resolve the moral hazard between the owner
and investors in the focused ¯rm.
However delegation can resolve the moral hazard problem in the unfocused ¯rm,
namely when diversi¯cation comes together with delegation. What we will show is
that, although a perfectly diversi¯ed ¯rm without delegation cannot raise external
funds, a diversi¯ed ¯rm with delegation can become viable. So, when diversi¯cation
is costly to achieve, because overload costs are large, delegation can be the only way
to raise external ¯nance.
Consider a perfectly diversi¯ed ¯rm in which the owner delegates the task of
running the projects to managers. Thus if there is an equilibrium in which the overall
e®ort levels are high enough for the ¯rm to repay its debt, this is determined by the
solution to the system of equations (32) to (34). Thus we have the following result:
Proposition 8 There are parameter values for which a su±ciently diversi¯ed ¯rm
can raise debt if and only if the running of projects is delegated to managers.
Proof: Consider the following numerical example
R = 2:4; pH = 0:8; pL = 0:4; c1 = 0:6; c2 = 0:025; y = 1:02; n = 1001
For these parameter values a perfectly diversi¯ed ¯rm cannot raise debt when the
owner runs all the projects by himself. Substituting the parameter values into the
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FOC of the owner who runs the projects himself given by28:
¢pR¡ ce = 0;
gives e¤ = 0:0375 which in turn implies p¤ = 0:415. The portfolio return is p¤R =
0:996; which is less than y, so no investor would lend money to this ¯rm.
However, if the owner delegates the running of projects, the ¯rm could be viable.
For instance, this is true for a salary equal to 0:4. Substituting the parameter values
into eq.(10) and (11) gives cm = 0:022727 and be = 0:27273 which in turn implies
p^d = 0:5157: This means that the average portfolio return net of salaries, bpd(R¡ w);
is larger than y: Hence, if the owner delegates the running of projects to managers, a
perfectly diversi¯ed ¯rm is able to raise debt.
Applying the central limit theorem we get that for n = 1001 the ¯rm is approxi-
mately perfectly diversi¯ed. We have that neither n nor c2, but only c is of importance
for the solution. Hence, it is possible to choose any degree of diversi¯cation by corre-
spondingly adjusting c2. In order for the ¯rm to be perfectly diversi¯ed the number of
projects must in principle be in¯nitely large, which means that c2 must be in¯nitely
small for c to be equal to 25:6 as it is in the example. However, since bpd(R ¡ w) is
strictly larger than y; the ¯rm would be viable even if there is a small probability of
default. Q.E.D.
This Proposition shows that delegation can be crucial in order to exploit the gains
from diversi¯cation, that is when, due to diversi¯cation, overload costs are high.
The comparison in the Proposition is made for a given number of projects. It
could well be that the e®ort levels would be higher in a less diversi¯ed ¯rm both
in the non-delegation case and in the delegation case. In both cases there will be a
number of projects n for which, increasing further diversi¯cation, the overload e®ect
will dominate the moral hazard e®ect: However, as pointed out, delegation reduces
the moral hazard problem of the owner. Hence, the incentive to delegate could be
even stronger in a less diversi¯ed ¯rm.
6 Conclusions
We have shown that delegation can be a way to reduce overload costs, although del-
egation gives rise to agency costs. Hence, separation of ownership and control can
arise as a response to overload costs. We also proved that a focused externally ¯-
nanced ¯rm has more incentives to delegate than a self-¯nanced ¯rm as dele s
F 0 6   T c  ( c )  T j  5 . - 0 . 0 4 2 D  0 . 0 4 8 O  ( e )  7 . 6  0   T D  - 0 . 0 4 2 D  0 . 0 4 8 C tt4 . 6  0   T D  - 0 . 0 4 2 D  0 . 0 4 8 w  ( e )  7 . t tt 7 c  ( d )  T j  1 1 . 1 0 8 6  T D  - 0 . 0 3 6   3 c  ( a )  T j  5 . 8 8 3 5 5 . 0 6   T u  ( e )  tn (e) 8 (t) Tj4./F  11.4 0 Tf .0355.06  Tp 0  Tc (t) Tj4.56 086 TD -0.036  3c96 0  TD   0 j5  Tc (c (t) Tj4.56 355.06 Tj036  3) Tj4.-56 355.0  Te Tj5Tj10.68 0  (a) TjTj10.68 0  TD389 0 j 5.16 0 3896 0  TD -56 11514.4 s036  0 36 0  TD   0 j5a Tc (s) 0  TD -0.02355.06  Tn (e) 
t4.920.68 0 -0.042D 0.048lttt eta 4 9 2 0 6 8  0  . 0 2 3 5 5 . 0 6   T f  0   T c  6 4 7 c  ( d )  T j  1 1 . 1 3 5 5 . 0 6   T tt ae 4 . 9 2 0 . 6 8  0  - 0 . 0 4 2 D  0 . 0 4 8 l e t
e4.920.68 0 -0.042D 0.048 0  Tc2c (e) Tj5-56 42D 0.048va¯ F 0 6   T c  6 4
etea
ett
t
a a t 8  1 6  0   T D    T 3 8 9  0  j  5 . 1 6  0  3 8 . 2 4  0   T D   T 3 5 5 . 0 6   T c  ( e )  
e t t t
t t
tttett t
t t e
ee e
Diversi¯cation and Delegation 29
improves the owner's incentives to exert e®ort. Thus externally ¯nanced ¯rms might
have additional reasons to delegate compared to self-¯nanced ¯rms. Moreover, ex-
ternally ¯nanced ¯rms may be forced to diversify to reduce moral hazard related to
external ¯nancing and we show, under some circumstances, delegation can be the key
ingredient to be able to diversify. Hence, conglomerates can arise as a solution to the
asymmetry of information in the capital market.
In this paper we have analyzed two extreme cases, one in which the entrepreneur
has enough inside capital to fund as many projects as he would like and one in which
the entrepreneur has no inside capital at all. If the entrepreneur had some little
but positive capital instead, say one unit, he could choose between running just one
project or become diversi¯ed enough to be able to raise external funds. His choice
would depend on the size of overload costs compared to agency costs. If it takes
time to increase the size of the ¯rm, he would undergo troubled time, since neither he
would have enough inside capital, nor he would be diversi¯ed enough to raise external
¯nance. In this period time the entrepreneur would need to ¯nd an investor willing
to monitor him. If this was too costly, he might prefer not to grow.
In order to focus on the bene¯ts of debt ¯nancing we have not allowed for other
types of cross-subsidization among projects, as for instance paying di®erent salaries to
di®erent managers. It could be the case that the owner might be willing to pay some
of the managers a higher salary than to others and then only monitor the managers
with the lower salary. It could also be the case that a better allocation could be
reached with the managers having lower seniority than investors in bankruptcy. This
however requires further investigation.
Another issue that would require further research is a discussion of the optimal
hierarchy in this context. We have shown that delegation might be pro¯table for a
given hierarchy, namely the one that minimizes overload costs. However, there might
be di®erent types of hierarchies that makes delegation even more pro¯table.
Although the argument in this paper proves to be relevant for conglomerates, we
think it may also apply to ¯nancial ¯rms.29 Just like the owner of the conglomer-
ate, a ¯nancial intermediary monitors projects. As a matter of fact we think that
our framework supports the idea of Gertner et al. (1994), that is that the di®erence
between conglomerates and banks steams from the di®erence in the control rights
associated with the asset used in the production. In a conglomerate ¯rm, the owner-
ship of the asset rests with the conglomerate. Hence the real control on the assets,
29The paper is in fact related to the ¯nancial intermediation literature, see for instance Diamond
(1984) or Cerasi and Daltung (2000), since the main result can be applied as well to the monitoring
of projects. If we were to interpret the running of projects as monitoring of projects, then one could
show that delegating the task of monitoring to a single investor, although well diversi¯ed, cannot be
always viable when there are diseconomies of scale in monitoring. However delegation of monitoring
to managers inside the ¯nancial intermediary can be the optimal solution. In Cerasi and Daltung
(1996) we had a preliminary analysis of delegation inside the intermediary although managers were
sensible only to private bene¯ts and not to monetary incentives.
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used for production, is in the hand of the formal authority, namely the owner of the
conglomerate.30 So, in case of disagreement between the manager and the owner, the
decision is taken by the owner. A bank, on the other hand, does not have control
rights on the assets of the borrowers, so that in case of disagreement, the banker can
only advice the borrower about what to do with the asset, but the real authority on
the asset rests with the borrower. Therefore, the banker has no guarantee that his
preferred project will be chosen with certainty. As Gertner et al. (1994) show, control
rights provide the owner of the conglomerate with higher incentives to monitor the
managers. Thus, a conglomerate should have stronger incentives to monitor than a
bank. In this paper, however, we have showed that in some cases also diversi¯ca-
tion increases the owner's incentive to monitor. This could then explain why banks
are typically more diversi¯ed compared to conglomerates: the incentive of the inter-
mediary to monitor borrowers comes from diversi¯cation instead of control rights.
This issue however has to do with the di®erence between inside and external capital
markets, which constitutes the topic of our future research agenda.
30We follow the de¯nition of Aghion and Tirole (1997) for real and formal authority.
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7 Appendix
We will show that there is only a symmetric solution in the benchmark case if c1 > c2.
Consider the self-¯nanced entrepreneur running n projects. His expected pro¯ts are:
¦ =
nX
i=1
piR¡ ny ¡ c12
nP
i=1
e2i ¡ c22
nP
i=1
P
j 6=i
eiej ;
where pi = pL+ ei¢p and ei is the level of e®ort in project i. The FOCs are given by
¢pR¡
Ã
c1ei + c2
P
j 6=i
ej
!
¸ 0; i = 1:::n:
We will show that ei must be equal for all i: First of all the FOCs must either bind
for all i or for any of the i. Assume that they were binding for some i and not for
others. That the FOC binds, it means that the e®ort level is smaller than 1. Since
c1 > c2; reducing the e®ort level from 1 it will have a larger impact on the FOC of
that speci¯c project rather than on the FOCs of all the other projects. This means
that the left hand side (LHS) of the other FOCs is smaller than the LHS of the project
for which the e®ort is less than 1, but this implies that they also must bind. For the
same reason the e®ort levels must be equal if all the FOCs bind. Assume instead
di®erent e®ort levels. The LHS of the FOC for the project with the lowest e®ort level
will then have the highest value of the LHS of the FOC. Hence, not all FOCs can be
binding at the same time, unless the e®ort levels are the same.
